报告题目：Quality Investment with Targeted Advertising（目标广告下的质量投资）

报告人：李长英（山东大学）

报告时间：2019年11月27日（星期三）上午10:30-11:45

报告地点：商学院大楼411会议室

邀请部门：经济学系

 

报告人简介：

李长英博士目前担任山东大学经济学教授，曾任山东大学经济学院院长，2003年获美国科罗拉多大学经济学博士学位，曾在南开大学任教。他主要研究产业组织理论，论文发表在Journal of International Economics、International Journal of Industrial Organization等著名经济学期刊。2006年获“安子介国际贸易研究奖”优秀论文二等奖（一等奖空缺），2007被列入教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划”。

报告摘要：

This paper studies the interaction between firms' advertising strategy and R&D incentive in a Hotelling-type model where two firms first choose their quality- enhancing R&D and then compete in advertising and price. Our analysis shows that equilibrium R&D and profit might be lower under targeted advertising than under uniform advertising, and quality levels in both regimes can be either greater or smaller than socially optimal levels. Moreover, even if targeting leads to a higher level of quality-price differential and an increase in consumer-product match, such a technology may hurt consumers and the society because it may generate a higher proportion of uninformed consumers.