报告题目：Efficiency of Bureaucracy: From the Perspective of Asymmetric Information从信息不对称的角度探究官僚体制有效性

报告人：陈美晨（华东理工大学）

报告时间：2021年4月29日（星期四）上午8:30-9:30

报告地点：商学院大楼318会议室

 

报告人简介：

陈美晨 博士，华东理工大学商学院讲师、奥利弗·哈特合同与治理研究中心研究员。2019年获圣路易斯华盛顿大学经济学博士学位，研究领域主要包括应用微观理论，博弈论，信息经济学。

报告摘要：

In practice, bureaucracy is often blamed to be inefficient due to its standardized procedure or tedious paperwork. This paper explores the efficiency of bureaucracy from the perspective of information asymmetry. A theoretical model is built where a principal allocates resources to heterogenous agents. The target of the principal is to match the resources with the proper type of agent, which may conflict with the agent’s interest. Each agent’s type is her private information and it is assumed that the principal can require flexible information about the type. We show that in the presence of information asymmetry and costly information acquisition, the principal is only able to provide finite standardized services to the agent. In addition, we endogenously derive the optimal hierarchical structure of bureaucracy and it is shown that the tedious procedure involved in bureaucracy functions as a screening mechanism.

 

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