发布者：经济学系 时间：2020-12-01 阅读次数：887
报告题目：Industry Structure and the Strategic Provision of Trade Credit by Upstream Firms（产业结构与上游企业对贸易信贷的策略供应）
Victor Song 博士, 加拿大西蒙菲莎大学彼迪商学院金融与创新创业跨学科助理教授，毕业于加拿大卡尔加里大学, 获得经济学与金融学双博士学位。研究方向包括：公司金融财务，产业组织，应用博弈理论。Victor Song 博士多次获得由加拿大西蒙菲沙大学和卡尔加里大学授予的最佳教学奖; 并在Review of Financial Studies 等世界顶级金融期刊发表论文多篇。
We explain trade credit financing as a strategic tool for a supplier to influence her retailer behavior in a product market, provide a new rationale for the existence as well as the contract structure of trade credit financing, and show why financially unconstrained firms occasionally finance their inventory with expensive trade credit. In our model competing supply chains deliver a homogeneous good to a market with imperfect competition where retailers have to make inventory decisions before demand is realized. When demand is weak trade credit financing makes the retailer more aggressive as he avoids having to finance unsold inventory at the high trade credit interest rate. The ex-ante expected cost of having to finance excess inventory at the high trade credit rate when demand is weak reduces retailers' optimal ex-ante inventory levels. When demand is high sales are constrained by inventory and competition is less intense. The modified product market behavior induced by trade credit financing increases the producer surplus at the expense of consumer surplus in oligopoly markets, while we find no benefit for producers in either monopoly or perfect competition. We empirically confirm an inverse U-shape relationship of trade credit use and competition for a sample of U.S. firms.