奥利弗·哈特合同与治理研究中心 学术论坛第1期

发布者:经济学系     时间:2020-09-18     阅读次数:242


报告题目:Signaling in Initial Coin Offerings(首次代币发行中的信号传递)

报告人:陈美晨(华东理工大学)

报告时间:2020年9月24日(星期四)上午8:30-10:00

报告地点:商学院大楼318会议室


报告人简介

陈美晨博士,华东理工大学商学院讲师,2019年获圣路易斯华盛顿大学经济学博士学位,主要研究应用微观理论、博弈论、信息经济学。


报告摘要:

Initial Coin Offering (ICO) is an emerging form of crowd-financing in which entrepreneurs sell tokens to finance the project before launching. We construct a theoretical model to investigate the optimal ICO structure from the perspective of signaling. In particular, we focus on how a more informed entrepreneur could signal the project’s potential return to the less informed investors through setting appropriate soft cap-—the minimum amount of collected investment to launch the project, and hard cap—the maximum amount that can be raised. It is shown that soft cap always works as an efficient signaling device while hard cap is efficient only if the project’s value is high enough.

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