讲座一：Managerial Optimism in a Competitive Market
主讲人：Baojun Jiang, Associate professor of Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract : Research has shown that many managers and entrepreneurs tend to be optimistic and are inclined to believe that negative shocks happen to them less frequently than to others. However, there is also evidence suggesting that such optimism is often inaccurate in reality and managerial optimism can lead to the failure of a company. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate the impact of managerial optimism on firms’ performance in a competitive market. Our analysis shows that a manager’s optimism about demand can increase the firm’s profit. Moreover, only one firm having managerial optimism can be win-win for both firms in a duopoly, because it can increase the level of product quality differentiation between the firms, alleviating price competition. However, if both firms have optimistic managers, the benefit of increased differentiation disappears, and firms are weakly worse off, compared with the case of both firms having realistic managers. Our research suggests that a firm should hire a realistic manager when managerial optimism is already pervasive in a competitive market.
报告人简介：Baojun Jiang is an associate professor of marketing at the Olin Business School at Washington University in St. Louis. He received a B.A. in economics and physics from Grinnell College, an M.S. in physics and an M.S. in electrical engineering from Stanford University, an M.B.A. from the University of Texas at Austin, and an M.S. and Ph.D. in information systems from Carnegie Mellon University. His current research interests include the sharing economy, platform-based business models, channels, innovations, competitive strategy, behavioral economics, and marketing-operations interface. His research has been published in top-tier journals such as Marketing Science, Management Science, Journal of Marketing Research, and Production and Operations Management. He was selected as a 2017 MSI Young Scholar by the Marketing Science Institute, and serves on the Editorial Review Boards of Journal of Marketing Research and Marketing Science.
讲座二：Pricing and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions for Vertically Differentiated Firms with Consumer Preference
主讲人：Tao Li, Assistant professor of Santa Clara University
Pricing and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions for Vertically Differentiated Firms with Consumer Preference
Abstract : This paper develops price and low-carbon competition models for vertically differentiated firms, which consists of one high-quality manufacturer (HM) and one low-quality manufacturer (LM). We investigate how manufacturers' low-carbon behaviors are affected by factors such as the cap-and-trade regulation, consumers' low-carbon preference and competing environment. Without the cap-and-trade regulation, as expected, we find that a manufacturer's price and emission reduction rate are always strategic complements. Under the cap-and-trade regulation, however, a manufacturer's price and emission reduction rate may be strategic substitutes when the carbon market price is high. Moreover, contrary to our intuition, our result shows that in most cases, a higher unit carbon quota can motivate the manufacturers to increase emission reduction rate. We demonstrate that, the implementation of cap-and-trade regulation cannot always motivate the manufacturer to increase his emission reduction rate. Furthermore, whether the carbon policy is conducive to the improvement of social welfare depends on the reasonable setting of carbon quota.
报告人简介：Tao Li joined the Operations Management & Information Systems department in the Leavey School of Business at Santa Clara University in Fall 2012 as an assistant professor. Professor Li’s research interests include supply chain management with a special emphasis on sourcing strategy with unreliable suppliers, supply chain coordination, and the operations-marketing interface. His scholarship has appeared in leading academic journals such as Production and Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research. His scholarship has been supported by the Santa Clara University Research Grant, the Leavey Research Grant, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China. He is the recipient of the Leavey School of Business Extraordinary Research Award.