格致微观与产业经济论坛：Banks as Corporate Monitors: Evidence from CEO Turnovers in China
报告题目：Banks as Corporate Monitors: Evidence from CEO Turnovers in China
This paper examines banks’ monitoring role in the replacement of underperforming CEOs in Chinese listed firms. We find that the presence of outstanding loans, on average, does not increase the probability of forcing out a poorly performing CEO. However, the sensitivity would be stronger if the underperforming firm relies more on secured and short-term bank lending. In addition, bank loans increase the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover in private firms, especially when joint-equity banks serve as the main lender. Such effect doesn’t exist when either the borrower or the lender is state owned. Our results indicate that government intervention reduces a bank’s incentive to monitor borrowers.
陆利平，现任教于荷兰阿姆斯特丹自由大学金融系，任助理教授。研究方向是公司金融，银行学，发展经济学等。荷兰Tilburg大学金融学博士，北京大学经济学硕士，上海财经大学法学学士。曾在Journal of Financial Intermediation和Journal of Banking and Finance等SSCI杂志发表过文章。曾任欧洲复兴开发银行顾问，芬兰中央银行的访问研究员。曾任Review of Finance等多家杂志的匿名审稿人。