报告题目：Coordinating the Right-Sized Coalition: Participation Boundaries in Collective Action Experiments（协调规模适度的联盟：集体行动实验中的参与边界）
报告人：郑捷（山东大学）
报告时间：2026年11月3日（星期三）10:30-11:45
报告地点：商学院318会议室
邀请部门：经济学系
 
报告人简介：
郑捷，山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师；国家级青年人才，山东省“泰山学者计划”特聘专家，山东大学理论与实验经济学研究中心（CREATE）主任。清华大学经济学学士、硕士，美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士、博士。国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization大陆首位副主编，担任多份SSCI/SCI期刊客座主编。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学，主持过多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题连续获“特优”评价），并多次在学术会议上做主旨演讲与专题报告。已有研究成果发表于《经济研究》、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名期刊。

 

报告摘要：Collective action often requires a coalition of the right size: too few participants leave the task incomplete, while too many can undermine success. In this paper, we investigate how participation requirements and tolerance for excess participation affect participation, task completion, and welfare in a theory-based laboratory experiment. Our model characterizes pure-strategy and symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in a coordination game in which successful coalition sizes form an integer interval bounded below by a participation threshold and above by an active upper boundary. The experiment varies the interval’s lower and upper boundaries across between-subject treatments, encompassing exact targets, tolerance intervals, and minimum thresholds. Overall, we find that raising the required participation target increases participation but also makes coordination more fragile, with task completion and welfare varying non-monotonically with the target. Allowing a tolerance interval yields higher task completion and welfare than requiring either of its endpoints as an exact target. These findings highlight a trade-off between mobilizing participation and maintaining coordination, suggesting that tolerance can preserve the participation gains associated with more demanding targets while limiting their coordination risks.