报告题目：Secret Wholesale Contracts in Source-to-Stock Markets and the Role of Buybacks（从寻源到库存市场中的秘密批发契约与回购）
报告人：Germain Gaudin（德国University of Freiburg）
报告时间：2026年9月24日（星期四）10:30-11:45
报告地点：商学院413教室
邀请部门：经济学系
 
报告人简介：
Germain Gaudin, Professor of Economic Policy (Competition Economics) at the University of Freiburg.
Germain's research is in industrial organization, with a particular focus on competition, digital markets, and vertical relationships. His work has been published in leading journals including the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, RAND Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, and Journal of Industrial Economics.

 

报告摘要：
We compare the effects of public vs. secret wholesale contracts in a supply chain where competing retailers selling horizontally-differentiated products purchase their inventory (source-to-stock) from a common manufacturer. We determine the demand conditions according to which prices are greater under public contracts than secret ones, and we discuss firms' incentives to disclose their contractual terms. Moreover, we investigate the role of buybacks and show under which conditions the manufacturer can obtain, under secret contracts, the same profits it earns under public contracts. We provide various robustness checks and extensions to our main results.