报告题目：Collusion on Surcharges under Uncertainty（不确定性下的附加费合谋）

报告人：陈智琦（加拿大卡尔顿大学）

报告时间：2025年6月27日（星期五）上午10:30-11:45

报告地点：商学院318会议室

邀请部门：经济学系

报告人简介：

陈智琦（Zhiqi Chen），现任卡尔顿大学校长教授（Chancellor’s Professor），《Canadian Journal of Economics》主编，以及《Journal of Economics and Management Strategy》共同主编（co-editor）。陈教授的主要研究领域是产业组织和国际贸易理论。自1991年在西安大略大学（the University of Western Ontario）获得经济学博士学位以来，他已在权威期刊上发表了50多篇文章和众多书籍章节，包括在《American Economic Review》、《Economic Journal》、《International Economic Review》和《RAND Journal of Economics》等国际一流经济学期刊上的文章。此外，陈教授在将经济学应用于竞争问题方面拥有广泛的咨询经验。他曾为政府和企业提供经济学专家的咨询服务，参与了与竞争政策和经济监管相关的多项咨询项目。

报告摘要：

In the presence of demand uncertainty, collusion on rigid all-inclusive prices reduces the colluding firms' flexibility in responding to demand shocks.  With partitioned pricing, the firms alleviate this problem by colluding on one component of the price (surcharges) while allowing free choice of the other component (base prices).  This paper shows that collusion on surcharges generates larger expected profits and is more sustainable than collusion on all-inclusive prices.  It also compares collusion on surcharges with collusion on price schedules that make each firm's all-inclusive price conditional on the realization of its demand shock.  It demonstrates that compared with this more elaborate form of collusion on all-inclusive prices, collusion on surcharges is still more profitable.