格致经济论坛第三十九期:On stable and efficient allocation mechanism for Priority-based Allocation Problems

发布者:商学院办公室     时间:2017-12-13

格致微观与产业经济分论坛第六期

报告题目:On stable and efficient allocation mechanism for Priority-based Allocation Problems(基于优先级的分配问题中稳定且有效的分配机制)

报告人:唐前锋(副教授,上海财经大学)

报告时间:2017年12月19日(周二)上午10:30-12:00

报告地点:三教102

邀请部门:商学院经济学系

主持人:陈雅静


报告内容摘要:For school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred acceptance algorithms. A nonempty set of students is called a top fair set (TFS) if when all students apply to their most preferred schools and all schools accept the best applicants up to their quotas, students in the set are always accepted, independent of other students’ preferences. We provide an elimination process to find the maximal TFS, if any TFS exists. We show that for any priority structure, iterative removal of TFS always produces a complete assignment if and only if the associated deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient, or equivalently, if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Furthermore, for any such priority structure, the assignment made by iteratively removing TFS coincides with that of the deferred acceptance algorithm.

   

报告人简介:唐前锋,经济学博士,上海财经大学经济学院副教授,2011年获美国德州大学奥斯汀分校 (The University of Texas at Austin) 经济学博士。主要的研究领域为微观经济理论、博弈论与市场设计。近年来主要从事择校(填报志愿)问题中的匹配机制设计以及相关的分配机制设计等基础理论研究。唐教授在经济理论与博弈论的国际顶级期刊发表多篇论文,包括Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Mathematical Economics、Social Choice and Welfare等。

 

 

 

×请先登录

账  号

密  码